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Abstract
International Safeguards is currently in an evolutionary process to increase effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the verification system. This is an obvious consequence of
the inability to detect the Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early
90’s. By the adoption of the Programme 93+2, this has led to the development of
Integrated Safeguards and the State-level concept. Moreover, the IAEA’s focus was
extended onto proliferation activities outside the State’s declared facilities. The effec-
tiveness of safeguards activities within declared facilities can and have been quantified
with respect to costs and detection probabilities. In contrast, when verifying the ab-
sence of undeclared facilities this quantification has been avoided in the past because
it has been considered to be impossible. However, when balancing the allocation of
budget between the declared and the undeclared field, explicit reasoning is needed
why safeguards effort is distributed in a given way. Such reasoning can be given by a
holistic, information and risk-driven approach to Acquisition Path Analysis comprising
declared and undeclared facilities [1]. Regarding the input, this approach relies on the
quantification of several factors, i.e. costs of attractiveness values for specific prolif-
eration activities, potential safeguards measures and detection probabilities for these
measures also for the undeclared field. In order to overcome the lack of quantification
for detection probabilities in undeclared facilities, the authors of this paper propose a
general verification error model. Based on this model, four different approaches are ex-
plained and assessed with respect to their advantages and disadvantages: the analogy
approach, the Bayes approach, the frequentist approach and the process approach.
The paper concludes with a summary and an outlook on potential future research
activities.
1 Introduction
Since the first ideas for supervising nuclear material, the verification system has evolved
constantly. After having had first experiences with item-specific safeguards according the
commitments in INFCIRC/66, the system of international safeguards was established by the
signature and ratification of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. The treaty imple-
mentation has mainly been governed by comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) and
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later the additional protocol (AP) with Integrated Safeguards. Until today this evolution
of verifying treaty compliance has continued under a holistic approach called the State-level
concept (SLC). The SLC’s main idea is to go away from material centric approaches to a
system analysis view of nuclear proliferation which clearly identifies the actors, their pos-
sibilities and their risks. Due to its general and comprehensive nature, the SLC has great
potential to replace voluntary offer agreements (VOA) in nuclear weapon States (NWS) and
to be used in other fields of treaty verification.
Underneath the new paradigmatic view to nuclear verification, the State-level concept es-
sentially consists of three processes which help developing State-level safeguards approaches
(SLA) [2]:
1. Identification of plausible acquisition paths.
2. Specification and prioritization of State-specific technical objectives (TO).
3. Identification of safeguards measures to address the technical objectives.
This paper concentrates on the first step which is also known as acquisition path analysis
(APA). APA is defined as the analysis of all plausible sequences of activities which a State
could consider to acquire weapons usable material [3]. The purpose of an APA is to deter-
mine whether a proposed set of safeguards measures is sufficient. Therefore, some overlap
to the second step, the specification and prioritization of technical objectives, is obvious.
The approach to acquisition path analysis used in this paper has evolved over the past years
[4, 1, 5]. Motivated from the fact, that the SLC tries to come up with adaptive safeguards
approaches, the main idea of this approach to APA is to account for differentiation with-
out discrimination. In order to accomplish this, the given information is processed in an
objective, transparent, reproducible, standardized and well-documented way in contrast to
classical reasoning-with-words- or black-box-approaches.
In order to fulfill these requirements, the methodology needs to quantify inter alia non-
detection probabilities of proliferation activities. While this has been successfully accom-
plished in the case of nuclear material diversion in declared facilities [see 6], quantifying
these probabilities for proliferation activities outside declared facilities is an unsolved task.
Therefore, this paper will present four approaches to accomplish this.
In the following, the methodology and its recent enhancements will be presented. Then,
the relation between the graph theoretic outcomes and the strategic assessment part will be
explained in detail. Afterwards, four possibilities for quantifying non-detection probabilities
will be presented. Finally, a conclusion and an outlook on future work will be given.
2 Materials and Methods
This paper’s approach to acquisition path analysis consists of three general steps: First, the
potential acquisition network is modeled based on the IAEA’s physical model and experts’
evaluations. Then, using this model all plausible acquisition paths are extracted automat-
ically. Finally, the State’s and the inspectorate’s options are assessed strategically. The
workflow is depicted in Figure 1. In the following, a description of the three stages will be
given. A more in depth discussion can be found in Listner, Canty, Niemeyer, Rezniczek,
and Stein [7].
During the first step of the process, also known as network modeling, a state-specific acqui-
sition model is set up. Mathematically, such a network can be seen as a graph with material
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Figure 1. Three step approach to acuisition path analysis.
forms represented by nodes and processes represented by edges. As a starting point serves
the IAEA’s physical model [8] where all proliferation relevant materials and processes are
formally described in a general acquisition model for nuclear weapons usable material.1
There are four categories of processes in the model: diversion from existing facilities (div),
undeclared import (imp), misuse of existing facilities (mis), processing in clandestine facili-
ties (cland). When assessing a State’s options for acquiring nuclear weapons usable material,
specific processes of these four types are put in or left out of the model. E.g. if a State does
not have an enrichment facility on its ground, all edges of type misuse in connection with
enrichment will be removed from the model. On the other hand, there will be always the
option for enriching in clandestine facilities and hence these processes will remain in every
State’s case.
Besides the mere presence of edges in the model, these edges will be assessed in terms of at-
tractiveness for the particular State. Therefore, three dimensions of attractiveness are used
which originate in the GIF methodology [9]: Technical Difficulty (TD), Proliferation Time
(PT) and Proliferation Cost (PC).2 For each process and each dimension grades are given
based on expert judgment. The grades range from 0 meaning a very attractive option to 3
being very unattractive. Using the arithmetic mean, for each edge e a single edge weight we
is calculated from these figures.
After having specified the edge weights, it is necessary to model the inspectorate’s side i.e.
the possible technical objectives t with their respective non-detection probability β(t)e on
certain edge e. Also the inspectorate costs ct generated by technical objective t have to be
quantified. Although no specific safeguards measures have been determined at this point,
an expert can estimate the costs for attaining a given detection probability based on expe-
rience and knowledge about a State’s capabilities, fuel cycle as well as existing safeguards
approaches. While these figures can be specified for the edges related to the declared fuel
cycle, i.e. misuse and diversion, deriving this information for the undeclared, i.e. undeclared
import and clandestine processing, is yet an unsolved task. Nevertheless, in this work it
is assumed that such a quantification can be done in principle for all types of processes
whether in declared facilities or elsewhere in the State.
1In principle, also the weaponization step itself could be modeled using a graph theoretic approach.
However, due to the definition of acquisition path analysis given in International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) [3], this paper’s approach ends at weapons usable material.
2These dimensions only represent technical aspects of proliferation as if no inspectorate was present. The
interplay of State and inspectorate will be considered separately in the third stage of the process.
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No Alarm Alarm
Compliant Behavior (0, 0) (−f,−e)
Non-compliant Behavior along path i (di,−c) (−b,−a)
Table 1. Game Theoretic Payoffs.
As a result of the first step, a directed multi-graph is produced that represents the State’s
options for producing weapons usable material including their attractiveness with respect
to time cost and technical difficulty. Furthermore, also the inspectorate’s options to control
the activities are given including the costs and non-detection probabilities in specific areas
of the State’s acquisition network.
This graph is now analyzed in terms of all technically plausible acquisition paths. Therefore,
a fully automated software using the depth first search algorithm extracts all paths from
node ’Origin’ to either node representing weapons usable material. For each path pi, the
overall attractiveness is calculated by the sum of the weights of the constituting edges E(pi),
i.e.
li =
∑
e∈E(pi)
we. (1)
The list of paths is then reordered by attractiveness and all paths are visualized. It has to be
emphasized that not only the shortest path but all technically plausible paths. Therefore,
this approach is comprehensive and avoids to ignore technically less attractive paths which
could be strategically interesting.
Using the results of the first and second step, especially the list of paths with their respective
attractiveness as well as the non-detection probabilities of technical objectives, the third
steps strategically assesses the options for both parties, i.e. the State and the inspectorate.
In order to accomplish this, all acquisition paths and the option of compliant behavior are
considered to be the State’s strategy set. On the other hand, the strategies of the IAEA
are all combinations of technical objectives (TOC) that have been defined in the first part
of the process. The overall non-detection probability of TOCj for a given path pi can be
calculated using the product rule for probabilities by
βij =
∏
e∈E(pi),t∈TOCj
β(t)e . (2)
For each strategy combination a pair of payoff values for State and Inspectorate (H1, H2)
can be defined (see Table 1). For the IAEA, the strategic outcomes in increasing order of
preference are undetected non-compliance (−c), detected non-compliance (−a), false alarm
(−e) and compliance without alarm (0). These parameter can be selected freely as long as
the ordering is kept.
Regarding the State, the strategic outcomes ordered increasingly by preference are detected
non-compliance (−b), false alarm (−f), compliance without alarm (0) and successful ac-
quisition along path i (di). The path length li calculated in step two is used to obtain the
payoff values for successful acquisition by
di =
l1
li
. (3)
The decision whether an alarm is raised by the inspectorate depends probabilistically on
the non-detection probabilities. Hence, for each strategy combination an expected outcome
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for both players can be calculated. In case the State decides to follow an acquisition path i
and the IAEA has TOC j in place, this payoff for the State is given by the expected benefit
from a successful acquisition plus the risk of getting caught red-handed, i.e.
H
(i)
1 = diβij − b(1− βij). (4)
For the IAEA, the expected payoff can be derived from the sum of the risks of detected and
undetected non-compliance , i.e.
H
(i)
2 = −cβij − a(1− βij). (5)
In case the State behaves in compliance with its given commitments, the outcome for both
sides is only determined by the false alarm risk with false alarm probability α, i.e.
H
(compliant)
1 = −fα (6)
for the State and
H
(compliant)
2 = −eα (7)
for the IAEA.
Based on these considerations, a stable strategy combination (H∗1 , H
∗
2 ) known as the Nash
equilibrium can be calculated using the Lemke-Howson-algorithm [10]. The Nash equilib-
rium is characterized by the fact that its impossible for either of the two actors to deviate
unilaterally from the equilibrium strategy and increase its expected payoff. Hence, it seems
rational for both players not to deviate and pursue the equilibrium strategy. This very
limited definition of rationality only means that the actors care for the risks and benefits in
they are facing.
Using the equilibrium payoff value for the IAEA and scaling the IAEA’s payoff parameters
to c = 1, it is possible to define effectiveness as
E = 100% +H∗2 . (8)
In case of 0% effectiveness, the equilibrium ends in non-compliance with no possibility of
detection. For 100% effectiveness, compliance with no false alarm is achieved almost surely.
As the ultimate goal of acquisition path analysis is the selection of a TOC inducing compliant
behavior (expressed by the term sufficient in the APA definition), this paper proposes to
use a TOC leading to a high effectiveness value in the Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, in cases where compliant behavior can be induced in the Nash equilibrium, it is
also possible and reasonable to gain an increase in efficiency. Iterating over a cost threshold
W and calculating the Nash equilibrium for this range of values, gives strategy for which a
given level of effectiveness can be achieved at minimum cost.
3 Four Approaches to Quantifying Detection Proba-
bilities
The previous section has shown how the model can be used to determine an optimal set of
technical objectives. As input on behalf of the State, the model requires an assessment of
each process’ attractiveness we and the resulting payoff values for each path di. On behalf of
the inspectorate, for each technical objective t a cost estimate for each technical objective is
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No Alarm Alarm 
Compliance 1 – α α 
Non-Compliance β 1 – β 
Figure 2. Verification Error Matrix.
needed as well as an estimate of the non-detection probability β(t)e for each process e given
that a technical objective t is in place. It turns out that the attractiveness values, the cost
estimates and the declared facilities’ non-detection probabilities can be obtained relatively
easily because there are models available for the estimation of these parameters. However,
until now there are no such models for the estimation of non-detection probabilities for pro-
cesses in covert facilities as well as undeclared import.
In the past, the estimation of such non-detection probabilities has been considered to be an
impossible task. The reasons for the reluctance to quantify these parameters can be found
in the lack of system boundaries of clandestine nuclear facilities as they can be located any-
where in a State. The same applies to the case of undeclared import, where the location
of possible indicators could even be found worldwide. Moreover, it is not even clear which
indicators could give the relevant hint to a clandestine facility.
All these problems seem to be good reasons to think about the detection of clandestine
facilities and undeclared import only in a qualitative way. However, this would lead to
the problem of how to justify the spending of budget on the detection of clandestine fa-
cilities against conventional safeguards measures whose effectiveness can be quantified very
elegantly. A model calculating quantitative estimates for the non-detection probabilities
can overcome this issue. Also, this problem is similar to effectiveness quantification in the
intelligence realm and there has been research on how to address this [see 11].
In the past it has been shown that hypothesis testing is a powerful tool that can be applied
in the context of treaty verification to estimate the errors [see 6]. It assumes that a State can
either behave compliantly or not. On the other hand, the inspectorate has the possibility to
raise an alarm or not. Thus, four event combinations result from this error model which are
displayed in Figure 2. The main diagonal entries of this matrix stand for a properly working
verification system which either raises an alarm if appropriate or does not if it would be
inappropriate. The off-diagonal elements however reflect errors in the verification system.
An error of the first kind, also known as a false alarm, will occur, if the State behaves com-
pliantly but the inspectorate raises an alarm despite that fact. This error’s probability is
denoted by α. The error of the second kind is also known as non-detection of incompliance.
This error will occur, if the State proliferates but the inspectorate is not able to detect this
behavior and thus will not raise an alarm. This error’s probability is denoted by β.
Based on this error model, the existing literature and developing new ideas, four possibilities
will be presented how to estimate the non-detection probabilities in case of undeclared facil-
ities or import. These suggestions should be seen as a starting point for further discussion
and research.
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3.1 Possibility A: The Analogy Approach
The first and by far the simplest possibility starts by looking into declared facilities. There,
the safeguards system can obtain a non-detection probability of βdeclared = 10% if all mea-
sures, like e.g. PIVs and IIVs, are in place. By analogy, the same non-detection prob-
ability of βundeclared = 10% is assumed for undeclared facilities in case all measures, like
e.g. open source information analysis taskings, are applied here as well. If only parts of
the measures are applied, a linear scaling procedure increases the non-detection probability.
E.g. in case only half of the measures are applied, the detection probability reduces from
1− βundeclared = 90% to 1− βundeclared = 45%.
This approach gives a model which is very simple and easy to understand. However, a
validation of the stated non-detection probabilities is merely impossible.
3.2 Possibility B: The Bayesian Approach
The second approach uses Bayes’ theorem to model the information analysis process and
then estimates the detection probability from a simulation step. In this context, the event
Aj means that the proliferation activity j, e.g. the use of a clandestine reprocessing facility,
is carried out by the State. B = {B1, . . . , Bn} represent the set of available information
pieces. Based on these probabilistic events, the Bayes formula retrieves the probability of a
proliferation activity Aj given a set of available information B as
P (Aj|B) = P (B|Aj)P (Aj)
P (B|Aj)P (Aj) + P (B|Aj)P (Aj) (9)
In this formula, the probabilities P (B|Aj) can be derived from the physical model which
lists indicators, i.e. pieces of information, with their probability of occurrence in case a spe-
cific proliferation activity is carried out. The probabilities given the complementary events
P (B|Aj) would have to be estimated by experts in a similar way. An open issue remains
how the prior probabilities P (Aj) and P (Aj) could be obtained.
Once the Bayes formula is applied to derive the probability P (Aj|B), the information analy-
sis process would raise an alarm, if this probability exceeds a given threshold T . In order to
derive the non-detection probabilities β, one checks the correctness of the information anal-
ysis process for any combination of B, Aj and Aj weighted by the probability of each event
combination. The error of the first second kind then gives the non-detection probability
β. Again, estimating the prior probability of each event combination remains an unsolved
problem.
As a conclusion, one can say that the Bayesian approach helps structuring the problem
of quantifying detection probabilities in a qualitative environment. Moreover, the physi-
cal model already includes certain information which can serve as input. However, it is a
non-trivial task to obtain the prior probability of a proliferation activity. In order to be
non-discriminatory, the methodology would have to assume the same priors for each State
although this hardly reflects reality.
3.3 Possibility C: The Frequentist Approach
As a third possibility, historical events in the field of non-proliferation can be used to retrieve
estimates for the non-detection probability. Therefore, the error matrix is filled with the
absolute number of events (see Figure 3). Using these figures, the non-detection probability
7
No Alarm Alarm 
Compliance 𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑤𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑤𝑤 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑐 𝐻𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑐 
Non-Compliance 𝐻𝑤𝑐𝑢𝑐𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑐𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝑓𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑐 𝑢𝑐𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐 
Figure 3. Estimated Verification Error Matrix.
can be estimated using
βˆ =
Hundetected non-compliance
Hundetected non-compliance +Hsuccesful detection
. (10)
Similarly, an estimate for the false alarm probability can be given by
αˆ =
Hfalse alarm
Hfalse alarm +Hcompliance without alarm
. (11)
In practice, the number of events can be obtained from the safeguards implementation
report or other sources of information. Also, one could think of aggregating the data using
different criteria such as counting only events that took place in a single year, that refer to
a particular State or that cover a specific proliferation activity.
The advantages of this approach result from the strong quantitative basis and the simplicity
because only counting events is required. However, the disadvantage of relatively few data
points for non-compliance are obvious. This could be a source of error.
3.4 Possibility D: The Process Approach
Finally, the fourth approach considers α and β to be ”‘measurement errors”’ of the inspec-
torate’s information analysis process. This information analysis process can be subdivided
into five components au¨ccording to the intelligence cycle [see 12]: plan, collect, process, an-
alyze, disseminate.
For each subprocess j, this approach estimates the errors for a false alarm, αj, and non-
detection, βj, based on the error sources within the respective subprocesses. Assuming
independence of error probabilities among the subprocesses, the overall errors can then be
calculated as
αtotal = 1−
5∏
j=1
1− αj (12)
and
βtotal = 1−
5∏
j=1
1− βj. (13)
An advantage of this approach is the fact that it helps structuring the problem of estimating
verification error probabilities despite the absence of complete error models. It also gives
hints where to improve the information analysis process. However, the quantification of
errors is still necessary on a lower level. This is not easy to accomplish for all subprocesses
of the information analysis process.
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4 Conclusions and Outlook
This paper has shown how acquisition path analysis can be carried out using a comprehensive
methodology which is yet compatible with the principles defined in Cooley [2]. Furthermore,
a possibility for determining technical objectives has been proposed. This approach delivers
a set of technical objectives with optimal effectiveness under the assumptions of a game
theoretic model. Besides the high degree of automation, this approach also allows for an
inherent randomization of technical objectives. However, the analyst has to specify a set of
parameters in this approach. Therefore a good understanding of the model is necessary and
the influence of the parameters on the model’s outcome is very complex.
A major point of criticism of this methodology has been the question how to quantify the
non-detection probabilities of proliferation activities outside declared facilities. As a starting
point for discussion, this paper has outlined four approaches how this quantification could
be implemented.
In the future, further case studies will have to be carried out with respect to the contin-
uous improvements of the methodology. This will include the analysis of the outcome’s
sensitivity on the selected parameters. In these case studies, special focus will be given
to the question how other areas, like the verification of disarmament treaties, can benefit
from this approach. Also, further work will be carried out regarding the quantification of
non-detection probabilities. Finally, the methodology will be iteratively improved with the
help of experts at the IAEA.
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Nomenclature
AP additional protocol
APA acquisition path analysis
cland processing in clandestine facilities
CSA comprehensive safeguards agreements
div diversion from existing facilities
imp undeclared import
mis misuse of existing facilities
NPT Non-proliferation Treaty
NWS nuclear weapon State
PC Proliferation Cost
PT Proliferation Time
SLA State-level approach
SLC State-level concept
TD Technical Difficulty
TO technical objectives
TOC technical objectives combination
VOA voluntary offer agreement
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